The primary concern is whether GoodCloud was enabled and connected when the malicious commands were delivered, rather than simply which firmware version you were running.
We have an anonymous GL-E5800 (Mudi 7) report on firmware 4.10.3 showing the firewall-rule indicator associated with the reported reverse-shell attack.
That said, firmware still matters because the vulnerable command-handling code resides on the device. I have not yet received confirmation of which router firmware versions contain the security fix.
If your Mudi 7 was powered off throughout the period when the malicious commands were delivered, it could not have received them while offline.
Models and firmware versions with reported indicators (as of Nov 22, 00:22 UTC):
Routers
-
GL-BE9300 (Flint 3): 4.9.0, 4.10.1
-
GL-MT6000 (Flint 2): 4.8.3, 4.9.0, 4.9.1
-
GL-MT5000 (Brume 3): 4.8.4, 4.9.0
-
GL-MT3000 (Beryl AX): 4.7.4, 4.8.0, 4.8.1, 4.9.0
-
GL-MT2500 (Brume 2): 4.7.4, 4.7.13
-
GL-AXT1800 (Slate AX): 4.8.3, 4.8.4 beta1
-
GL-E5800 (Mudi 7): 4.10.3
-
GL-X3000 (Spitz AX): 4.7.4, 4.8.3, 4.8.4 snapshot
-
GL-SFT1200 (Opal): 4.8.3
-
GL-AX1800 (Flint): 4.8.3, 4.8.4 beta3
-
GL-MT3600BE (Beryl 7): 4.9.0
-
GL-BE3600: 4.10.1
-
GL-BE14000: 4.9.1, 4.9.2
KVM Devices
-
GL-RM1: V1.8.0 release3, V1.8.2 release1, V1.10.1 release3; some reports did not identify firmware
-
GL-RM1PE: V1.10.1 release2
-
GL-RM10: V1.8.2 release1, V1.10.1 release2, V1.10.3 release8, V1.11.0 beta3
-
GL-RMQ1: V1.8.5
These are anonymous, unverified reports of known indicators, not a definitive list of vulnerable firmware versions or confirmed infections. Some submissions are repeat scans of the same device.
The latest community dashboard contains 612 total submissions, representing 482 consolidated reports after repeated submissions are folded together. Of those, 145 devices show known attack traces:
-
126 with reverse-shell indicators
-
19 with
gl-helpermalware indicators -
10 with a reverse shell still running when checked
-
3 showing malware persistence after a restart
Additionally, 182 devices were reported as having restarted since November 20, with 167 appearing clean. However, a clean result after restarting does not prove the device was never compromised, since memory-resident evidence may have disappeared.
Importantly, the presence of malware indicators on a beta firmware version does not necessarily mean that version is vulnerable to the original attack. Malware or configuration changes may have survived an upgrade.
If your model isn't listed, that does not mean it is unaffected.
You can check your device using the independent community diagnostic tool here:
The tool checks for known indicators of compromise, supports preserving evidence, and offers optional anonymous reporting to the community dashboard. It is an independent community project, not an official GL.iNet tool.
A clean result does not guarantee that the device was never compromised, particularly if it has been restarted since the incident. For a device with confirmed compromise, removing the known indicators alone is not sufficient to establish that the device and its credentials are secure.