The Internet is a scary dangerous mine field. A router with a firewall can protect you, but only if you use it wise.
So you've got a home router, that has one connect to the Internet and one to the LAN. Within the LAN you can access different services. The web front end (UI), the DNS forwarder, the DHCP Server, ... From the Internet you don't. why would you even want to access your router insecure from the internet?
Now we have a special situation, your Brume makes exact the same, it protects the LAN from the WAN. But as we are knowing the Brume WAN is your home LAN, we can open the services. I hope there is no thread in your home LAN.
Why would you want to access a device in your LAN from the insecure internet? Could you make sure you are the only one who is using this path you opened?
But if you open the WebUI to the Internet, you are on your own. Everybody can connect to the UI and bruteforce your password, use nginx exploits, ... If you don't know what you are doing, than don't take this risk.
And believe me, if you think you are smart and put the http(s) port from publicip:1234 to LANIP:80, this is not really a countermeasure.
WireGuard is build in another way. You can only access with a valid credential, that is much more complex than a standard username and a most times simple password. I am not a fan of the user management from GL-iNet. I would like to rename the admin. To add staged users with role based permissions, one per service ...
But I used to work in enterprise networks, here we are in home environment. Who want to track 7 usernames with complex passwords?
If you forward Wireguard from the Internet trough your home router to your GL-iNet device, it is fine.
If you forward your Admin UI from the internet in any way, it is an issue. And nobody else will be responsible if something will happen, based on that.
You want a VPN to access your LAN securely from remote. Then take care everything which is in the LAN stays there and maybe in the VPN.