A very great indicator is that it is using abnormal traffic as upload, like @bruce said usually a firewall:
goes one way, it always allows local source -> wan, and when this initation happened the other line (the destination) is allowed to respond back.
It will block it if this first initation never happened from your side (the local lan) and the first initiator was the destination as inbound.
This is where portforwarding allows the other side to talk first, and or if you use dmz you allow all ports to this device (you surely don't want that).
so in most situations devices are safe behind the firewall, but it is possible a device was already infected at factory, but you will notice that really quickly.
The only remote vulnerability can be dns poisoning, it is important to know how your devices update and communicate this can be seen via tcpdump, do they visit http or https?, and you can try to encrypt dns with DoH or DoT that is a way to make it a little safer but these things can always be a possibility.
I myself don't trust my isp so i make sure they cannot mitm on recognizable patterns, most of these high level attacks are well automated but encryption makes it alot harder in case of isp compromise, alot of hackers especially the APT ones don't have much interest into the average person, but if you are a developer or administrator or a company employee with possible keys, you are on their radar.
This is what i experienced myself some years ago working with maven projects, and dependencies not set to scope provided, eventually someone sees a recognizable pattern and mitms it and runs a malicious unit script, that is how it happened.
Hackers don't always show their presence, until they observed you long enough to automate a attack.
So you really want devices update via https as minimum.
You can also isolate groups of devices with vlans so that if a breach happens it will not go through all devices, especially if you use windows with questionable suspicion you can isolate it from other networks, and if you use passwords from a password manager most of these local device to local device attacks fail, because they cannot be bruteforced 